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I INTRODUCTION 
Patent laws have generally included a "morality exclusion", a clause which allows 
patent authorities to exclude otherwise patentable inventions on the ground that 
patenting them would be contrary to morality. These morality exclusions languished 
almost unused fo~ hundreds of years, but recently have been revived, mostly by 
European opponents of genetic engineering. 
At the same time, indigenous peoples throughout the world have begun to assert that 
the current western intellectual property system fails to take account of their needs. 
This paper considers whether the morality exclusion in the New Zealand law could 
help address Maori concerns. 
The focus of this paper is on current patent issues in New Zealand . Tt is important, 
however, to fit the debate into the international context. There are three reasons for 
this. Firstly, the impetus for demand for indigenous intellectual property rights has its 
roots in international moves towards self-determination. Secondly. anx local solution 
must not conflict with New Zealand's international obligations. Thirdly. much of the 
debate about the function of the morality exclusion in patent law has taken place 
overseas. 
The paper first looks briefly at international debate on patenting traditional medicine 
and the place of morality in the development of patent law. The second part focuses 
on current New Zealand patent legislation and practice, and considers how the 
morality exclusion in the Patents Act 1953 may affect applications relating to 
traditional Maori medicine, given the impo11ance placed by the Crown on Treaty or 
Waitangi issues. The paper examines justifications for five possible models and 
2 
assesses the advantages and disadvantages of each. Lastly, it considers how the 
morality exclusion fits in to the future development of New Zealand patent law. 
TI THE IN1ERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
A Traditional Medicine1 
Tt has been estimated that some 80% of the world's population rely on traditional 
medicine, either because it is cheaper and/or more easily accessible, or because it is 
more culturally appropriate.
2 Use of traditional medicine has historically been on a 
small local scale, either self-administered or provided by traditional healers, often 
without any state involvement at all.
3 
3 
Recently, however, traditional medicine has become more mainstream even in the 
industrialised world, partly because of consumer interest in more "natural" 
alternatives to conventional medicine, and partly because new techniques of analysing 
and synthesising plant compounds have made it more commercially attractive. -1 The 
World Health Organisation has recommended the integration of traditional healing 
into primary health care,) and throughout the world governments have begun to 
1 For this paper traditional medicine is taken to mean the non clinical use of plants and herbs, usually 
developed following protocols developed by communities over several generati ons . but now including 
modern extracted or synthesised forms of the plant or herb . 
2 World Health Organisation Fact Sheet o 134 September 1996. 
1 Katrina Brown " Medicinal Plants, Indigenous Medicine and Conservation of Biodiversity in Ghana" in 
Timothy Swanson (ed) Intellectual Property Rights and Biodi versi ty Conservation (Cambridge 
University Press 1995) 20 I 
1 13rown. above n 3. 203 
' World Health Organisation 1he Promo/1011 and Derelop111e11/ ol fraJitio11a/ Medic111e (WHO, Geneva, 
1988) 
consider whether and how alternative medicine should be regulated by the state6 Part 
of thi s state regulation is the intellectual property regime and the most directly 
affected area is patent law. 
The international debate on patenting traditional medicine basically asks two related 
questions; can it be patented and should it? 
Discussion on the first issue involves legal questions as to whether traditional 
medicine can meet the basic patentability requirements of novelty and invention. 
Traditional medicine, by its very nature, has problems meeting both criteria.
7 There 
has been much news coverage of thi s, especially with regard to the much-publicised 
withdrawal of the US patent for medicinal use of tunneric after opposition from 
Tndian scientists who were able to demonstrate centuries of use.
8 The conventional 
view is that traditional knowledge falls outside patentable items, forming part of the 
"common heritage of mankind" .9 
This paper concerns mostl y the second question, which invol ves not only legal issues. 
but al so ethical , political and social considerations. Ultimately, the question as to 
whether traditional medicine should be patented is a question for the public and their 
elected representatives, although in the short term the question is effectively in the 
hands of the patent officers and courts. 
6 In New Zealand , see "Ca ll for Strict Testing o f Alternative T herapies" T he Do minion. Wellington. 9 
August 2000, 19 
7 Darrell A. Posey Traditional Resource Rig/us ( Internatio nal Union fo r Conservati on of Nature and 
Natural Resources Cambridge, UK 1996 ), 3 
~ For a comprehensive account of the turmeric case and the simila r cases of neem and basmar, rice see; 
<http://ww,~itd ./org/issues/india6 htm> (last accessed 31 /8/00) 
·> Posey above 117 , 5 
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Those who object to patenting of traditional medicine do so on the grounds that 
indigenous people should retain control over their traditional knowledge (including 
medicine) and that it should not be "expropriated" especially by large pharmaceutical 
companies likely to be based overseas who are unlikely to treat it with respect. 
10 Tn 
this context intellectual property issues have a "symbolic importance which bears no 
relation to the limited rights actually granted". 
11 Patenting the sacred Amazonian herb 
ayahuasca, for example, has been compared to patenting the Christian cross, 
12 and 
some activists speak of "neo-colonialism" 13 or even "slavery". i-1 
Others feel that if traditional medicine is patented indigenous peoples should receive 
compensation for their contributions. A recent report by the Tndian government points 
out that "the valuable leads provided by traditional knowledge save time, money and 
investment" for industry and therefore "a share of benefits must accrue to creators and 
holders of traditional knowledge." I) 
B International Standardisation 
At the same time as calls for self-determination for indigenous peoples. there is a 
move in the opposite direction towards worldwide standardisation. As far as patents 
10 
Darrell A. Posey and Graham Dutfield Beyond intel/ect11al Property (International Development 
Research Centre Ottawa 1996) 7 
11 
Philip W. Grubb Pate111sfor Chemicals. Pharmace111ica/s and 1Jioiech110/ogy (Clarendon Press 
Oxford. 1999) 126 
12 
Glen M. Wiser "PTO Rejection of the 'Ayahuasca'Patent Claim" (Center for lnternat1onal 
Environmental law November 1999, http://www.ciel.org/ptorejection.html ( last accessed 3 I /8/00) 
11 
Aroha Mead "Indigenous Rights to Land and Biological Resources" Paper presented to Institute for 
International , 1994 
14 Graham Dutfield Biopiracy: 1'he S/aFery of the New Mil/e1111i11m? S111·e~1· Nol. (Working Group on 
Traditional Resource Rights, Oxford 1998), I 
15 
Indian Government Submission to Conunittce on Trade and Environment / Council for Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Ri ghts, WT/CTE/W/156. July '.?.OOO. 2 
6 
are concerned, the most relevant agreements are in the economic area, including 
intellectual property provisions, most notably the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Trade (TRTPS). 
16 Patents are also influenced by social welfare, health and 
human rights ( especially indigenous rights) provisions. The most recent area for 
international harmonisation is ecology The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) 17 directly impacts on patent law.
18 The importance of the CBD to the 
discussion is that it rejects the "common heritage" idea of traditional knowledge, 
19 
replacing it with the principle that states have sovereignty over their own resources. 
The CBD specifically refers to patents in connection with developing nations. 
20This 
was apparently a response to a feeling that "the biodiversity rich South was providing 
genetic resources free to the North, which was then selling back products developed 
from these resources subject to exclusive patent rights.
21
" Many feel that the CBD is 
incompatible with TRTPS,
22 and countries who have signed both, like New Zealand. 
are considering how they can best meet the requirements of both. The question is 
currently under review by the World Trade Organisation.
23 
C Patents and traditional medicine 
The traditional justification for patents is economic utilitarianism: inventors are 
ir. TRIPS ( Annex 1 C, Marrakesh Agreement) was signed on 15 April 1994 and came into effect on l 
January 1995. New Zealand was an original signatory 
17 The CBD was signed at the United Nations Rio Earth Summit in 1993 . New Zealand was an original 
signatory 
18 Posey and Dutfteld, above nlO, 53 
t'J Philip W. Grubb Patents.for ( 'hemicals. Pharmaceuticals and Rio1ed1110/ogy (Clarendon Press 
Oxford, 1999), 45 
:!o CBD Article 16 
2 1 Graham Dutfield "The World Trade Organisation, TRJPS and the Biodiversity Convention (Working 
Group on Traditional Resource Right s, Oxford J 9Q8), I 
22 Du1field above n21 
23 See vVTO Trad!! and J~vim11111en1 News R11/leti11 TE/033 (July 2000) , 6 
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allowed a limited monopoly over the exploitation of their invention in return for a 
perceived benefit to society as a whole.
24 The consideration for the state's granting of 
patents is said to be the benefit to the state of technological and economic progress. 
Society benefits not only from the economic benefits of the invention itself but at the 
end of the protected period the knowledge is free for all to use. The limited duration 
of patents is thus an integral part of the system, but makes it unsuitable for protection 
of traditional medicine.25 
Because the system is designed to encourage innovation, by providing an incentive for 
investment in new ideas, patent laws have always distinguished between human 
creations and creations of nature, between patentable inventions and unpatentable 
discoveries. According to Comish, "Discovery is the unearthing of causes, properties 
or phenomena already existing in nature ; invention is the application of such 
knowledge to the satisfaction of social needs. "
26 Most patent laws in the world 
therefore require novelty and an inventive step. 27 Tn the field of traditional herbal 
medicine, this means that the medicine itself cannot usually be patented. Patents are 
not available for naturally occurring plants, but they may be for a synthesised 
equivalent, a combination of ingredients with an unpredictable combined effect, or a 
24 Justin Hughes "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" in Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman 
Property f,aw Volume TT ( Dartmouth, Aldershot UK 1993 ), I 0 
2
' Posey & Dutfield above n l 0, 79 
26 W R Comish !111ellect11al Property: Patents, CoEl'nght, Trade Marks and Allil!cl 1?1ghts (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1989), 5. 5 
27 Posey & Outfield above n I 0, 77 
process for manufacturing or standardising herbal medicine?' Some patent regimes 
specifically exclude medical treatment from patentability. 29 
8 
Many traditional medicines will be unpatentable because knowledge about their use is 
already in the public domain. For this reason some indigenous groups advocate 
"defensive publication" of traditional knowledge, for example, compilations of local 
use of medicinal herbs in order to prevent patenting by companies30 Of course, to 
some extent this is unnecessary; even if a company patented an ointment based on 
active ingredients found in rangiora, for example, that would not prevent anyone 
plucking a leaf from a rangiora tree in the bush to apply to a cut. But many indigenous 
peoples are offended by the idea that their traditional medicines might be 
appropriated by strangers. This may be an emotional response, but that does not mean 
it can be disregarded. 
Herbal medicine is now big business;" and it is not surprising that pharmaceutical 
companies are seeking patent protection for their considerable investments in 
research in this area. A pharmaceutical product takes on average twelve years from 
initial research to sale. 12 Tt is estimated that 25% of prescription drugs are derived 
from plants, and that of these some 75% have been developed with some input from 
2
R Graeme T Laurie "Biotechnology and lntellectual Property : A Marriage of Convenience?" in Sheila 
McLean ( ed) ( 'ontemporwy lss11es in !,m1·, Jdedici11e and F,1hics 
29 In New Zealand cJajms for the treatment of humans are allowable except where the claim relates to 
methods of surgery or of treatment or preYention of di sease. fVl' llconw h m11Jaf1011 , . < ·0111missio11er o f 
1-'ale/lls [1983] NZLR 385 and IPONZ Patent Examiners' Manual 4 55 
30 Dr Gerard Bodeker fnJixenous Medical K11owlel~!.{e , the !,mi · cmJ Poli1ics <f Protec/1011 (Conference 
paper presented at the Oxford Intellectual Research Centre on 25 January 2000) 
11 According to Bodeker. The World Bank estimates that b\· 2050 the herbal medi cine market will be 
worth USD 3 trillion worldwide. Seen 30 above. 
32 US submission to WTO TRIPS review IP/C/W/ 16~ October 1999, 2 
9 
traditional knowledge. ·11 These kind of figures have led to accusations of "biopiracy", 
accompanied by denunciations of the patent system and the whole "western" property 
· 34 regime. 
At the other end of the scale some indigenous peoples have attempted to use the 
current intellectual property system to retain control over traditional knowledge and 
culture. A local example is the recent attempt by some Maori to trademark a haka35. 
But traditional knowledge sits uneasily within the current intellectual property 
framework. Some problems indigenous peoples experience with the current 
intellectual property system are common to all forms of intellectual property, such as 
ovmership and duration. Often traditional knowledge has no one "author" and it is 
held collectively. 3°Even if there is an identifiable owner, the intellectual property 
system will only protect rights for a certain time. Indigenous peoples wish to protect 
their knowledge for perpetuity. 37 
The requirements for novelty and invention make patents particularly unsuitable for 
protecting traditional medicine because its very traditionality - the fact that it has been 
used for a considerable time- works against it 18_ Of course, new developments in the 
field could be patented by indigenous peoples just as they could by anyone else. But 
33 A Gray Between the Spice of l,?fe and the Melting Pot: Biodiversity Co11serw11ion ancl its Tmpact 011 
l11dir;e11011s Peoples (International Working Group for Indigenous AJiairs (IWGIA) 199 l) 4 
34 See for example Anthony Rees "Biodiversity and Intellectual Prope11y Rights: Implications for 
Indigenous People of South Africa" . < htt ://www.ihafcom/africa/990504 .htm1 > (last accessed 
3 1/08/00 
1
' Oriwa Solomon and others from Ngati Toa submitted the application in February 1999 but withdrew 
the application and have not yet resubmitted it .. 
16 
Posey and D11tfield , above n l 0, 10 
37 
Gray, above n 33, I I 
,s Ministry of Economic Development Maort a11d 1he Po/C'11/111g of Life: Form Jm ·enfium (Wellington, 
1999) Part Two,4 
10 
the primary concern of Maori and other indigenous peoples is to protect their culture 
from expropriation and this is essentially a defensive move '
9
. Active attempts by 
indigenous peoples to patent their own knowledge are unlikely to meet this goal 
because of the problems outlined above. This paper therefore focuses on what might 
be termed "defences against patenting", that is, attempts by indigenous peoples to 
prevent "offensive" patents being granted. Since the objections are essentially moral. 
it seems sensible to consider the use of the morality exclusion in patent legislation 
which may meet the needs of indigenous peoples within the current system. 
D Patents and Morality 
Some question whether there is any place at all for morality in patent law since its 
justification is primarily economic. Critics argue that undesirable inventions can be 
excluded by other laws
40
. Yet a morality clause has always been included in almost 
al I patent systems 4
1
. The relevant New Zealand provision is s 17( 1) Patents Act 1953 
(as amended) which states 
I r it appears to the commissioner in the case of any application for a patent that the use of the 
invention in respect of which the application is made would be contrary to morality, the 
Commissioner may refuse the application. 
The provision has its origin in the 1949 UK Patents Act, on which the 1953 New 
Zealand Patents Act was based
42 "Morality" is not defined in either Act. and the 
19 Above n 39, 6 
•
10 Barry Hoflinas1er "The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms" I P.1 4 I C)88 l , J 
-1i Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword "Parenting Human Genes. Legality, Morality and Human 
Rights"in J. W I larris (ED) f>mpl!rl)' f'roh/e111s: From ( ;e11f!s w f'l!ll.17011 Fund,·. (Institute of Ad\·anccd 
Legal Studies, London, l 997 ), l 0 
-1
2 New Zealand ( '0111111,mtary 011 Holsln11y's /,m1·s of F,11g!a11c/. Chapter I 17. Patents and Inventions. 3 
exclusion has been little used. 43 The word "may" in the provision makes it clear that 
the power to exclude is discretionary. An example often given of items historically 
judged unpatentable because of immorality is contraceptives, but it seems that these 
were often simply excluded under the general prerogative to grant or refuse patent 
applications without specific reference to morality. 44 
l l 
Tn contrast the United States view of patent law has long excluded considerations of 
morality. 45The US Supreme Court in Diamond v Chakraharty ·16 famously 
commented that it was "without competence to entertain these arguments"~ 7. This 
approach has its supporters outside the United States. Nott argues that the European 
Patent Convention should drop all reference to morality because it is "irrelevant and 
counterproductive".48 When the intellectual property law was being reviewed in 1993 
The New Zealand Ministry of Commerce lobbied to drop the morality exclusion 
because it felt that "inventions contrary to law or morality can be controlled by the 
law against which the invention is contrary". Tt has to be said that this seems to 
assume that immorality and illegality are the same thing, which is clearly not the 
case.~9 
4 1 Grubb, above n 11, 56 
44 Grnbb, above n I I, 58 
•
15 
Stephen A. Bent, Richard L.Schwaab, David G.Conlin and Donald D.Jeffery J11te/lec111al Proper/1· 
Rights in RioM;hnology Worldwidl! (Macmillan Stockton Press. New York, 1987 , I O'.: 
46 Diamond" Chakrabarry 447 US 303 (1980) 
47 Above n 46, 307 
4
R R. Nott "the European Biotech Directive - An End in Sight"7 (Reprise) Patent World. September 
1994, 5, 6 
49 for an interesting discussion of the difference between law and morality see Ronald Dworkin Tak mg 
Rights Saio11slv ( 1978) 
12 
Tn the event a reference to morality was retained in the 1994 amendment, partly, it 
seems, in response to Maori concerns)°. Tt should be noted that the amendment went 
through Parliament hastily with a package of other reforms designed to give effect to 
New Zealand's obligations to the World Trade Organisation following the Uruguay 
Round and Parliamentary debate on the patents provisions was severely limited
51
. Tn 
any case, it was expected at the time that there would shortly be a wholesale 
rewTiting ofNew Zealand intellectual property law.
52 
The TRIPS agreement, significantly, retains the idea of morality (and the similar 
"ordre public'') despite US opposition)3. The relevant provision is Article 27.2 which 
states 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention of which within their 
territo1y is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. 
T he concept seems to have been included at the insistence of E uropean nations, who 
modelled the TRTPS morality clause on the E uropean Patent Convention (EPC) 
section 53(a/~ which excludes from patentability inventions "contrary to ordre puhlic 
or morality" . Neither "morality" nor "ordre public" is defined in either provision, but 
the European Patent Office (EPO) guidelines offer some guidance. They state that 
"the purpose of these exclusions is to prevent the patenting of inventions likely to 
)O Hansard(29 November 1994)517 NZPD 5224-5225 
) I Hansard (29 November 1994)5 17 NZPD 5224-5225 
52 Rt Hon Don McKinnon above n 50, 5225 
)J Richard Ford "Morality of Biotech Right s. Differing Legal Obligations in E.urope'l" 1997 El PR 3 15 
'
4 Michael Blakeney frude Hela!ed A.~pn:I.\ of /111ellecf11al f'ruperfl · High!., : A co11c1.,e (j11iJe In !he 
TRIPS Agreement (Sweet and Maxwell , London, 1996) para I OJ 
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induce public disorder or riot or to lead to generally offensive or criminal behaviour" . 
The guidelines propose as a test that "the general public would regard the invention 
as so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable"55 . This seems 
to set a very high standard; the original drafters apparently intended that it should be 
used exceptionally.)6 Tn recent times, however, a different test seems to have been 
preferred, at least in the context of biotechnology. Faced with complex arguments and 
widespread public concern about genetic engineering, the EPO adopted a balancing 
test approach in the "Oncomouse" application57 .. This approach is reflected in the 
recent European Community Biotechnology Patenting Directive,58 which includes a 
(non-exhaustive) list of immoral inventions "likely to cause animal suffering without 
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal"59 . While decisions of the European 
Patent Office are obviously not binding in New Zealand, it is submitted that the EPO's 
approach is influential for several reasons. Firstly, the wording of Article53(a), which 
is not part of New Zealand law, is similar to TRfPS Article 27.2, which is. Secondly. 
Decisions of the English Courts are persuasive in New Zealand, and as the United 
Kingdom is part of the EPC, EPO decisions will affect English law. Also. most recent 
decisions about morality have come from the EPO which is generally highly 
respected
60
. While so far this "balancing" test seems to have been applied only in the 
controversial biotechnology area, it might be seen as a recognition that patenting 
issues are becoming more complicated. This is true not only in the biotechnology 
'
5EPO Guidelines C IV 3.1 
56 Beyleveld and Brownsword, above n 4 I , I 0 
'
7Harvard fra11S?,e11ic Mouse T 1990 (OJ 1990, 476) 
58European Parliament Directive 98/44 
'
9 Article 16 
60 Grubb, above n I I , 262 
area, but arguably in all areas where the notion of "public good" is unclear, and this 
could include indigenous issues. 
E Criticism of the morality exclusion 
14 
Critics of morality clauses argue that this weighing of complex ethical arguments 
should not be left to patent officers, who are not trained in the area and do not have 
the time -or, perhaps, the desire- to take wider policy issues into account. The British 
Biotechnology Group recently asserted that "the morality exclusion places an unfair 
burden on patent officers. "6 1 Such complex issues, according to critics, are better 
dealt with by the legislature. They argue that it is difficult for patent officers and 
courts to know which test to apply; the concept of morality is subjective and difficult 
to define and changes not only with place and time, but also within any one society at 
any time. Critics of the morality exclusion also argue that the standard of debate in 
recent EPO cases has been emotive and, some argue, misguided62: those who use it 
really object to the research behind the patent and confuse patent issues with safety 
and animal welfare issues which could be better regulated in other ways61 . As a way 
of stopping morally repugnant research it is ineffective, as even if opponents succeed 
in preventing patenting of an invention it can still be used and arguably it is easier to 
regulate through the patent system, which requires disclosure. 6~ 
6 1 Grnbb, above n I I 256 
''
2 Shelley A.Rowland and James A Piper "Patents and Biotechnology" , 
<htt ://www. i e at.co .nzlresource/life.html >,2 (Last accessed 3 I August 2000 J 
r., Hoffmaster, above n 40, 4 
6 1 Hoffmaster, above n 40, 3 
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F Advantages of the Morality Exclusion 
On the other hand , the morality clause does have its supporters Some say that if the 
purpose of the morality exclusion is to protect public morality, the patent examiners 
as members of the public are as well-qualified as anyone else to judge moral issues.65 
Any subjectivity and failings of patent officers are to some extent balanced by the 
possibility of appealing against their decisions. The existence of a morality exclusion 
is also said to ensure, however imperfectly, that there is some mechanism for public 
debate on important subjects, which might not otherwise be addressed. For concerned 
groups the patent process is a relatively cheap and high-profile way to get their 
concerns aired. Tt could also be stated that a// law changes with time, and morality is 
found in all areas of the law. Just because other areas of the law need reform too does 
not mean the patent process cannot play a part. 
Ill MORALITY AND TRADITIONAL MAORT MEDICINE 
A Introduction 
New Zealand contains about 100 native plants with known medicinal properties66 . 
Use of these by Maori is well documented, although there is some uncertainty about 
to what extent Maori used medicinal plants internally before the arrival of 
67 Europeans. 
65 Grubb, above n 11 , 78 
66 S.G. Brooker, R.C Cambie, R C . Cooper Ne ll' 7..eolcmd Medicinal Plams (Heinemann. Auckland, 
1987) 19 
67 Brooker, Cambie, Cooper, abo\'e n 66. 39-4"2 
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Seventy-four percent of New Zealanders are believed to use herbal or other "natural" 
medicines68, although few of these are derived from native plants69 Several small 
local companies have begun selling remedies based on native plants 7°. None of these 
is at present patented. This illustrates the point that traditional medicine can be 
exploited commercially without being patented. 
Along with many indigenous peoples, some Maori claim that the very idea of 
"owning" traditional knowledge of any kind is offensive and call for a wholesale 
rewriting of New Zealand intellectual property laws to take account of indigenous 
concerns-11 . Even if it was agreed that this was desirable, however, it would take a 
long time to achieve. Tn the meantime, the existing morality exclusion could be useful 
to Maori (and others) who wish to prevent patenting of traditional medicine. Tt does 
not seem so far to have been raised as an issue with relation to traditional medicine. 
As we have seen, the patent system is administered by the state. Public, including 
Maori, can influence the process directly, by lodging objections or questioning 
decisions in the courts through the process ofjudicial review. (That the latter can 
have a huge impact is illustrated by the NZ Maori Council Case72 ) . They can also 
influence the way the law develops more indirectly, through lobbying and general 
"consciousness-raising" , and through the election process. 
''
8 New ZeaJand Cha11er of Health Practitioners, New ZeaJand Health Survey, Wellington. 1997 
(,') The product list of New Zealand's largest producer of Herbal supplements, Thompson I utrition Ltd , 
contains no products based on New Zealand native plants 
7° For example, Living Nature of Kerikeri produces a range of ointments based on manuka oil 
71 
See for example the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and lntellectual Property Rights oflndigenous 
Peoples at <http ://www.tpk.govt. nz/mataatua/mataengl.htm > (Last accessed 31 /8/2000) 
72 NZ Manri Co1111ci/ r A ffomey General [ 1983] 2 NZLR 142. For a critical discussion of the impact of 
the case, see David Round fr11tlr or Treazv ·J (Canterbury University Press, 1998) 126-7 
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Maori have a uniquely strong influence on the state because of the existence of the 
Treaty of Waitangi and the widely-held view that it obliges a "partnership" approach 
between the Crown and Maori 71 . Article n of the Treaty is said to give Maori tino 
rangtiratanga ( stewardship) over all taonga. According to some Maori , this gives 
guardianship rights over all native flora and fauna, including associated intellectual 
property rights. Thi s is the basi s for the Wai 262 claim currently before the Waitangi 
Tribunal. 74 The Ministry of Economic Development acknowledges that "in terms of 
the Treaty of Waitangi , patents are granted by the Crown and therefore the Treaty 
relationship between the Crown and Maori is relevant to al I aspects of the patent 
process" . 75 
In New Zealand, the patent system is administered by the Intellectual Property Office 
of New Zealand ("TPONZ"), part of the Ministry of Commerce. 
When a patent is submitted it is examined and published in the TPONZ Journal and 
interested parties have three months to lodge an objection. The grounds for this are set 
out in the Patents Act76 . They do not include a reference to morality. Tn any case, the 
problem here would be for Maori to establish the necessary standing. After a patent 
has been granted a third party can apply to have the patent revoked. Tn practice, this 
process is more important than opposition . The grounds for revocation are essentially 
n This view ha s recently been repeated by Minister of Health Annette King . See "Taking the Treatv 
Too Far" , The Dominion, 30 August 2000. I 0 
74 WAJ-262, First A.mended Statement of Claim, 10 September 1997,para 2 2 
75 Ministry of Economic [Ji,velop111e11I. A lwm u11d rh<' Pare111111g 1~( /,1/e Form !11w11no11s (Wellingron. 
2000) 2 
76 Patents Act 1953 . Section 2 1 
18 
the same as for opposition 77 . Tt seems therefore that morality is unlikely to be raised 
successfully as a ground for either. 78 This should be contrasted with the European 
legislation which allows as a ground of opposition79 non-compliance with Articles 52 
to 57, which includes the morality exclu·sion80. Tt seems that New Zealand is unlikely 
under the current legislation to see colourful opposition proceedings as have 
happened before the EPO Opposition Board. 
This leaves several opportunities for morality to be used under the current New 
Zealand law. Firstly, Maori could encourage the development of guidelines for 
TPONZ officers on the use of the morality exclusion which include a Maori 
perspective. Secondly, after a patent has been granted Maori (with sufficient standing) 
could apply for judicial review of the exercise of TPONZ's discretion in granting a 
patent, citing the Treaty of Waitangi as a relevant consideration that should be 
considered .. Of course, litigation is expensive and time-consuming, and many Maori 
feel that they should not need to resort to the courts to enforce their rights81 . 
B Is patenting of Maori Traditional Medicine Contmry to Morality? 
Possible arguments for excluding patents for traditional Maori medicines on the 
grounds of immorality may be summarised as fol lows; 
I. Tt is immoral to patent any traditional medicine at all. 
07
Patents Act 1953. Sections 41 and 42 
"s However, prior use is a potentially useful ground for opposition and revocation Sections 2 1 (I) ( d) 
and 41 (1) (d) 
79 EPC Article I 00 
~u EPC Article 53 (a) 
'
1 Maori lawyer Moana Jackson has recently commented that "The litigation has got to stop" <Tnterview 
with Kirn Hill , National Radio, 30 August 2000) 
2. It is immoral for non-Maori to patent traditional Maori medicine. 
3. Tt is immoral for foreign individuals or corporations to patent traditional Maori 
medicine. 
4 . It is immoral to patent traditional Maori medicine without Maori compensation. 
5. Tt is immoral to patent traditional Maori medicine without Maori consultation. 
It should be noted that some of these are contradictory, in that items 3 and 4 at least 
seek economic advantage for Maori while item 1 rejects completely the concept of 
economic rights over nature. We will consider each assertion in turn . What are the 
justifications behind each assertion? How might they work in practice? 
I ft is immoral to patent traditional medicine at all 
19 
There are two possible rationales behind this assertion . The first is that that, following 
the "common heritage" idea, traditional knowledge should be freel y available to all. 
The second rationale is that ownership rights over nature are repugnant from a 
spiritual or ethical viewpoint. This is reall y an argument against the whole Western 
property system. According to Tania Tetitaha,82 "Ownership is inconsistent with the 
compartmentalisation of man from nature, a logical derivation of the 'self : other' or 
'nature : man' dichotomy which was foreign to the Maori world view." The Maori 
world view is said to include "a sacred regard for the whole of nature and its resources 
as being gifts from the gods . .. a sense of responsibility for these gifts as the appointed 
82 Tania Tetitaha, Jhe J11terrelatio11ship between H11ma11s, Plants. Animals and (iod.1, (Paper presented 
to the Talking Technology Trust, 1997), 7 
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stewards ... a sense of corn m itment to safeguard al I of nature's resources as taonga for 
· 83 future generat10ns". -
To put this idea fully into practice could involve adding products or processes 
connected with native plants as an unpatentable exclusion to the Patents Act. The 
TRTPS agreement allows Member States to make exclusions of this kind,x4 and some 
argue that the CBD obliges them to use such exceptions to protect biodiversity.85 The 
problem with the biodiversity approach is that it is necessary to distinguish the plants 
themselves from intellectual property rights over them. The recently passed Costa 
Rican !,ey de Riodiversidad which attempts to reconcile Costa Rica's obligations 
under TRTPS and the CBD, does this explicitly. Tt states that while the resources 
themselves may be owned by individuals or the state, the properties of these resources 
can be owned by nobod/
6
. Preventing patenting, however, will not prevent 
exploitation, although arguably patenting encourages culling of native plants. 
The other problem here is the meaning of "contrary to morality" . Tf we take the 
approach that it means "objectionable to the majority of society" (what Beyleveld and 
Brownsword call "the yuk factor" 87), then the patenting of traditional Maori medicine 
is unlikely to meet the test. There is no one Maori viewpoint - as xxx points out, many 
Maori are in favour of commercial enterprise. Even if patenting were highly 
objectionable to all Maori , they are still in the minority of New Zealand's population .. 
On the other hand, if the "balancing test" approach were used, a strongly felt opinion 
81 
Bev James Jhe Maori Nelatio11ship with the L111·iro11me11f (Wellington Regional Council, 1993) 8 
84 TRIPS Article 27 .2 
85 
See. for example, the address by Erica Daes, WJPO Roundtable on Intellectual Property and 
Indigenous Peoples, Geneva July 1998 
s,, Durfield 
87 Above, 11 4 I 
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by a small sector of society might be felt to outweigh the supposed advantages. 
2 ft is immoral for non-Maori to patent traditional Maori medicine 
The rationale behind this is that traditional knowledge is tapu,88 and should only be 
used by certain individuals, or in certain ways (such as in combination with 
prayers). 89 In practice this is difficult to achieve through the patent system or indeed 
by any law which might be seen as interfering with freedoms of religion. Tt seems that 
voluntary requests would be the only way to achieve this goal. Tn any case, secret 
knowledge seems to contradict the whole rationale of the patent system, which allows 
knowledge to revert to the public domain. Te Puni Kokiri also identifies a risk of 
"overprotection"90 . TRIPS allows member states to place restrictions on the use of 
patents, but any restrictions have to be reasonable. Article 30 states that 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent holder, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
Such a view of exclusion is unlikely to appeal politically to the general population. 
3 ft is immoral for foreigners to patent traditional Maori medicine 
This argument has more of an economic justification, being an argument to retain the 
economic benefits in NZ so as to benefit both Maori and non-Maori . Taken to the 
SR E Best 'J.he Maori School of leaminf< (Government Printer, Wellington, 1959) 29 
89 
See Brooker, above n 66, " '.2 - 42 for accounts of traditional practice of Maori tohunga. 
911 
Te Puni Kokjri Nf<a 'J.aon[<a Ji,k11 lho No NRa 'J.11p1111a Maori Genetic, C11/t11ra/ and J11tellec111a/ 
Property Rights (Wellington, 1994) Para 5 
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extreme, this would probably mean patents being held by the state. This approach is 
favoured in South America9 1 but is unlikely to appeal in free-market New Zealand, 
although the Government apparently sees itself as a "guardian/katikai of cultural 
heritage", including intellectual property rights92 . Even if the government held New 
Zealand patents on behalf of New Zealanders, however, it would be unable to prevent 
products derived from native plants being patented overseas. The position could also 
be difficult to defend where related plants with the same active agreement are found 
elsewhere. 93 The most serious impediment, however is that reserving patents for New 
Zealanders would seem to conflict with New Zealand's WTO commitments. TRIPS 
Article 27. I states 
Patent rights shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place 
of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced . 
At the same time as TRIPS was agreed, the WTO put in place a new binding disputes 
procedure. The implication of this is that if another state took New Zealand to the 
Dispute Settlements Board of the WTO and won, New Zealand would either have to 
I · k · 94 comp y or ns sanctions . 
../ ft is immoral to patent tradttional lvfaon medicine without A1aori compensation 
The justification for this is that patents are supposed to reward labour and so the prior 
9 1 Dutfield, The Costa Rican Biodiversity Law A Brief S11mma1y (Working Group on Traditional 
Resource Rights, Oxford, 1998) l 
92 Ministry for Culture and Heritage, (iovem111e11t'.~ Role in !he Cultural Sec/or : A S111wy of the J:,sue.s 
(Wellington, 1998) 
91 
For example the active ingredient in puriri is found in many related species of rhe mex genus in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Fiji , India and Europe and medicinal use has been recorded in all these 
areas.: Brooker, above n .66, 236 
9
~ World Trade Organi sation Tmdi11g i11ro the F11111rC:! (WTO. Geneva. 1999 ) 38--42 
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labour of Maori in identifying uses for native plants and guarding them should be 
rewarded. The difficulty with this justification in the New Zealand context is that 
often non-Maori seem to have made significant contributions to the development and 
collation of Maori medicine.95 
Under this model anyone successful in gaining a patent would be granted it on 
condition that they made suitable licensing or royalty arrangements with Maori . 
Under TRIPS Article 30, as noted above, any restrictions have to be "reasonable". 
The main practical problem would be identify to which Maori body royalties should 
be paid. Also, presumably it would raise the price of any product successfully 
patented. 
5 ft is immoral to patent traditional Maori medicine without Maori consultation 
The rationale for this is that Maori should be able to signal offensive uses and should 
be consulted by TPONZ in accordance with the Crovvn's obligations under the Treaty 
of Waitangi . How persuasive any objection from Maori would -or should- be is open 
to discussion , but on the plus side there are already model s for Maori consultation 
which could be adapted without much difficulty. 
Maori are often represented on state bodies, usually those that concern environmental 
issues, but lately social bodies too such as community health boards _% It must be 
noted, however that in these cases the legislation concerned specifically addresses 
''-' Brooker above n 66, 32-42 
')"For a criticism ol'thjs approach see "Treaiy Clause Danger Ahead", The Dominion, Wd lington, l 5 
August 2000, 8 
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Treaty issues 97. The Patent Act does not. is not surprising, given its age and origin. 
When the Act was amended in 1994 there was some suggestion of adding Treaty of 
Waitangi issues, but it was felt that this would better be addressed in the proposed 
Tntellectual Property Bill. 98 
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Tt can be argued that a stage should be added to the patent application requiring 
consultation with Maori , for example, adding a Maori committee (as in the Resource 
Management process). 99 Some will argue that its recommendations should not be 
binding; although Maori views may be strongly held , they do not represent the views 
of New Zealanders as a whole and if the "public good" is the base principle, then a 
patent should not be excluded as immoral just because a certain part of society finds it 
objectionable. But if the recommendations are not binding some will dismissed the 
consultation process as mere "window-dressing." 
C The future of New Zealand Patent Law 
Assuming that New Zealanders decide that they do wish to address Maori concerns 
this could be achieved in three stages, each requiring various degrees of reform . 
I Total ref'orm 
At the most drastic extreme, New Zealand could completely re-write its intellectual 
property law and create a completely new sui generis system for protecting traditional 
n See, for example, the Hazardous and New Orga ni sms Act section 8 
n Rt Hon Don M cKinnon, above n 50, 5225 
'N For an overview of the process, see http ://www ennanz.govt. nz 
Maori knowledge of all sorts, such as the model proposed by Te Puni Kokiri 100 
Many indigenous groups throughout the world have called for this, including 
Maori . 101 Tt has the advantage of addressing the whole problem of traditional 
intellectual and cultural property rights at once. Tf sufficient time were taken for 
discussion this would be the most complete solution, but it would take a long time. 
25 
Tn reality New Zealand is unlikely to take this path alone. Impetus for this kind of 
change has come from various international organisations and there is no shortage of 
d . . I d I ,02 propose internat1ona mo e s. 
2 Patent Act Reform 
New Zealand could reform its patent law to take account of Maori concerns. For 
example, a clause could be added to make it explicit that the Patents Act must be 
interpreted in line with the Treaty of Waitangi. The morality exclusion could be 
rewritten to exclude specifically matters offensive to Maori. The opposition and 
revocation grounds could be rewritten to include offensiveness to Maori or the wider 
"contrary to morality" as a ground for application. Compulsory consultation with 
Maori could be added. Perhaps a Maori committee could be added as in the 
Hazardous and New Organisms Act. No doubt all this would add considerably to the 
workload of patent officers and possibly would make patent prosecution a slower and 
more costly process. Critics would argue that reform of the Patents Act alone is an 
unsatisfactorily piecemeal approach and a more radical overhaul of all legislation is 
100 Te Puni Kokiri above n 90 
101 Mataatua Declaration, above n 71 
102 Several models are considered in detail in Posey above n 7 
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needed. On the other hand, relatively large changes could be made with little reform 
of the law and it would lead to greater certainty. Reform of the Patents Act is not 
likely to happen in the near future, partly because the government already has a heavy 
legislative load, but mostly because the government has shelved any reform until the 
Waitangi Tribunal reports back on the WAT-262 claim. Tt would probably now be 
wise to wait also for the report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Engineering 1<>3 
. Both address Maori intellectual property concerns. 
3 Retter use rf the current morality provision 
Tt seems unlikely, therefore that either of the above two reforms are likely. This leaves 
us with the current Act. Maori can use the general novelty and invention requirements 
and the morality exclusion, as outlined above. Perhaps this could be combined with 
clearer guidelines for patent examiners as to how the morality exclusion should be 
applied in practice. This could be combined with voluntary consultation with Maori . 
For example, the IPONZ forms to be used when applying for a patent could draw 
applicants' attention to the possibility of consulting with Maori , and suggest ways in 
which this could be done. This could be combined with other regulations and 
protocols outside the patenting process, such as ethical guidelines for researchers 1°4. 
The advantage of this is that it requires no change to the law at all and it is likely to be 
acceptable to the non-Maori public. The disadvantage is again that it addresses only a 
101 The W AI-262 Claimants have recently been granted "interested person" status by the Conunission 
For a li st of approved interested persons see <http ://www gmcommi ssion.govt.nz 
104 See, for example, International Society of Ethnobiology Code of E thics at <http:// 
users. ox .ac. u k/- wgt rr/isecode. htm 
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small part of Maori concern - and voluntary protocols can be ignored. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Maori concerns about the patent system need to be addressed. Ultimately, if 
Parliament decides that it is appropriate, the most complete solution would be to 
create a sui generis system specifically designed to accommodate traditional Maori 
knowledge, including medicine. A less drastic, but less complete solution would be to 
refonn the Patents Act 1953 to address Maori concerns. 
Tn the meantime, the morality exclusion in the current Act could go some way to 
meeting Maori concerns without the need for reform . Any use must be practically 
workable, politically acceptable and consistent with New Zealand's international 
obligations. Tn practice the provisions for opposition and revocation are unsuitable, so 
this means either lobbying to have the patent examiners take more notice of the Maori 
view of morality, or applying for judicial review. 
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